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SECTION 271(b) OF THE PATENT ACT OF 1952:
CONFUSION CODIFIED
BASED as they are on opposing expressions of public policy, patent rights,
creating legal monopolies, and the antitrust laws, designed to foster competi-
tion, often collide. The judge-made doctrines of contributory infringement
and misuse are among the most important attempts that have been made to
reconcile these recurring conflicts. Contributory infringement, the actionable
tort of knowingly aiding or abetting another to infringe a patent,' is, to the
patentee, a valuable device for preventing competitors from destroying his
legal monopoly. Without it an adroit competitor could profit from the paten-
tee's invention, and still avoid liability for direct infringement, by omitting
one step or element of the patent.2 Admittedly the patentee may sue as a
direct infringer any party who adds the missing element in using the com-
petitor's product. However, the remedy is often unfeasible; frequently it will
be the ultimate consumer who completes the patent, and there may be
thousands of consumer-infringers. 3 The misuse doctrine, on the other hand,
protects competition. Analogous to the equitable defense of clean hands,
misuse insulates the over-zealous competitor from liability for direct 4 or
contributory infringement 5 whenever the patentee has gone beyond his rights
under the patent law by attempting to gain the equivalent of patent protection
1. The tort of contributory infringement finds its foundation in the law of joint
tort-feasors. See American Tel. & Tel. v. Radio Audion Co., 281 Fed. 200 (D. Del.),
aft'd, 284 Fed. 1020 (3d Cir. 1922) ; Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80
Fed. 712 (6th Cir. 1897); Wallace v. Holmes, 29 Fed. Cas. 74, No. 17100 (C.C. Conn.
1871).
Although the idea of contributory infringement is not limited to process or combination
patents, it has had its greatest development in that area.
2. A direct infringer of a patent is one who makes, uses or sells the patent as described
in the specifications. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) (1952) ; George Close Co. v. Ideal Wrapping
Mach. Co., 29 F.2d 533, 535 (1st Cir. 1928). Since the patent monopoly is the patentee's
right to prevent others from practicing or using only the invention specifically covered
by the grant, 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1952), it is often easy to avoid direct infringement by vary-
ing one or more elements of the disclosed product or process. See, 'e.g., Vance v. Camp-
bell, 66 U.S. 427 (1861) ; Prouty v. Draper, Ruggles & Co., 41 U.S. 335 (1841) ; Band-it
Co. v. McAnery, 131 F.2d 766 (10th Cir. 1942).
3. For examples of situations in which suit against the direct infringer is of no
practical value, see Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 213 U.S. 325
(1909) (sale of records to the 45,000 owners of Victor machines) ; Westinghouse Elec. &
Mfg. Co. v. Precise Mfg. Corp., 11 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1926) (sale of transformers for
home radio receivers).
4. E.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); American
Lecithin Co. v. Warfield Co., 105 F.2d 207 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 609 (1939).
5. E.g., Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938); Carbice Corp. v.
American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); J. C. Ferguson Mfg. Co. v.
American Lecithin Co., 94 F.2d 729 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 573 (1938).
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for a product or service not within the scope of the patented invention.6 More-
over, misuse will bar recovery even when the infringer has felt no economic
detriment from the patentee's wrongdoing.
7
The development of the misuse doctrine has confused the boundary between
the protection afforded patentees and the leeway allowed competition. In the
half century before the doctrine of misuse was developed, contributory in-
fringement continually expanded the patentee's legal monopoly,8 until eventu-
ally he was able to control even the sale of staple articles of commerce used
in connection with his patent. 9 The ease with which patents could be abused,
6. Under the "clean hands" doctrine a court of equity will deny relief when the plain-
tiff is himself guilty of wrongful conduct with respect to the subject matter sued on.
DE FUNIATC, HANDBOOK OF MODERi Eou'ry § 21 (1950). Similarly, a patentee found
guilty of misusing his patent by attempting to control articles not included within the
patent grant is denied relief from infringement or contributory infringement. See Morton
Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (salt tablets); Carbice Corp. v.
American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931) (dry ice); Dehydrators, Ltd.
v. Petrolite Corp., 117 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1941) (turkey red oil).
A patentee who has misused his patent is not forever denied relief. If he purges him-
self by discontinuing the illegal practices he will again be in a position to obtain relief
for violation of his patent monopoly. See, e.g., Sylvania Industrial Corp. v. Visking Corp.,
132 F.2d 947 (4th Cir.), petition for cert. dimnissed on motion of petitioner, 319 U.S. 777
(1943).
7. The goal of misuse is to limit the patent monopoly to the confines of the patent
grant. The primary purpose in denying the patentee protection is therefore to prevent any
extension of the monopoly, rather than to protect the individual defendant. See, e.g.,
Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
Hereinafter, the term patentee shall be used to refer to both a patentee and to the
assignee of a patent.
8. Both contributory infringement and misuse were originally judge-made causes of
action. They did not obtain statutory recognition until the Patent Act of 1952. See H.R.
Ri-P. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 28 (1952) ; Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 3
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 9, at 105 (1951).
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 672 (1944) (concurring opinion
of Black, J.). When misuse found its first expression in Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1916), see note 11 infra, contributory infringement had
long been an active force in the patent law. Wallace v. Holmes, 29 Fed. Cas. 74, No. 17100
(C.C. Conn. 1871) is generally believed to be the first case granting a patentee relief
under a theory of contributory infringement although Snyder v. Bunnell, 29 Fed. 47
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886) was the first case in which the term "contributory infringement"
was used. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-
Continent Inv. Co., supra (quoted in 27 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 150, 172-74 (1944)). One
commentator traces contributory infringement to even earlier cases. See Mathexvs, Con-
tribn tory Infringement and the Mercoid Case, 27 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 260, 265 (1944).
9. In the leading case of Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), the Dick Co.
sold its patented machine and appended to the machine, physically as well as contractually,
the license restriction that the machine be used only with unpatented stencil paper, ink,
and other supplies made by the Dick Co. Henry, knowing of the license restriction, sold
ink for use in one of the machines. The Court, arguing from the fact that a patentee
might exclude all others from use of the invention, declared that the patentee might exer-
cise the lesser right of permitting use only upon prescribed conditions. It then held
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combined with a renewed concern with the evils of monopoly, 10 led the courts
to enunciate the doctrine of misuse as a counterbalance." Misuse developed
into a severe limitation on the patentee's freedom; under the Supreme Court's
much mooted Mercoid decision,12 the owner of a combination patent has only
two legal methods of developing his patent commercially-selling a license to
every applicant, without discrimination, or undertaking the risk himself of
marketing his new product, complete with all its elements.' 3 Mercoid left the
law in confusion. Some language in the case seems to question the very ex-
istence of the doctrine of contributory infringement, at least as to combination
that violation of these license conditions was contributory infringement. See also Rupp
& Wittgenfeld Co. v. Elliott, 131 Fed. 730 (6th Cir. 1904) (shoe buttons) ; Broderick
Copygraph Co. v. Mayhem, 131 Fed. 92 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1904), aff'd, 137 Fed. 596 (7th
Cir. 1905) (ink); Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77
Fed. 288 (6th Cir. 1896) (shoe buttons). But see note 11 infra.
10. Two of the most significant pieces of antitrust legislation, The Clayton Act, 38
STAT. 730 (1914), and the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 STAT. 717 (1914), were
enacted immediately prior to the first case expounding the misuse doctrine. See note 11
infra.
11. The policy behind misuse was first enunciated in Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1916). The Court expressly overruled Henry v.
A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), note 9 supra, and held that an inventor may not re-
strict the use of unpatented materials used with, but not a part of, a patented machine.
In Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931), misuse,
as a doctrine, 'was first developed. The Court stated that a patentee, using his patent to
obtain control over a staple element used in his patent, would be denied recovery in a suit
for contributory infringement. Thus the reasoning used to support the result in the case
was entirely independent of defendant's innocence or guilt.
12. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944). This case, here-
inafter cited as Mercoid, was followed by the companion case Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-
Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944), which held the patentee in violation of the
antitrust laws.
13. Mercoid for the first time held it to be misuse to attempt to monopolize an unpatented
element of a patented combination having no use other than in the combination. The courts
had often held it to be misuse to tie the right to use a patent to the sale of an unpatented
component of a patent. See notes 4 and 5 supra. But prior to Mercoid it had never been
held to be misuse to tie the license to a component, patented or unpatented, which had no
use other than in the combination. See, e.g., Diamond, The Status of Combination Patents
Omwed by Sellers of an Element of the Combination, 21 J. PAT. OFF. Scc'v 843, 849 (1939)
(predicting that misuse would not be extended this far). Since the Mercoid reasoning was
based on the theory that the patentee was extending his control beyond the limits of the
combination patent, it would often apply to a patented component as well, particularly if a
competitor held a competing patent which worked equally well in the combination patent.
See, e.g., Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940).
Thus, after Mercoid, the patentee could seldom make the license to use the combination
patent contingent on the sale of a part, but less than all, of the combination. For exhaustive
discussions of the problem of making commercial use of combination patents in the light of
Mercoid, see Rich, Misuse, A New Frontier?, 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 391 (1952) ; James,
The Use of Patents to Control Unpatented Materials, 28 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 427 (1946);
Note, 12 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 345 (1944).
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patents.' 4 Yet lower courts in later decisions have given patentees more
liberal protection than the Mercoid holding would seem to permit.15
The development of the misuse doctrine not only left its scope unclear, but
frequently impinged on the concept of contributory infringement. Even
under the Supreme Court's broad statements misuse does not limit the defini-
tion of contributory infringement, since misuse is simply an affirmative de-
fense. 6 Paradoxically, the doctrine of contributory infringement still gives a
14. Mr. Justice Douglas stated: "The result of this decision, together with those which
have proceeded it, is to limit substantially the doctrine of contributory infringement. What
residuum may be left we need not stop to consider." Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv.
Co., 320 U.S. 661, 669 (1944).
Several lower courts have stated that they believe Mercoid has eliminated altogether the
cause of action for contributorily infringing combination patents. See, e.g., Stokes & Smith
Co. v. Transparent Wrap Mach. Co., 156 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1946), rev'd, 329 U.S. 637
(1947) ; Landis Mach. Co. v. Chaso Tool Co., 141 F.2d 800 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 720 (1944) ; Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Hughes Tool Co., 61 F. Supp. 767 (D. Del.
1945), aff'd, 156 F.2d 981 (3d Cir. 1946). One court denied a patentee relief, holding that
the very act of bringing suit for contributory infringement was itself misuse. Stroco
Products, Inc. v. Mullenbach, 67 U.S.P.Q. 168 (S.D. Cal. 1944).
15. In Amalgamated Dental Co. v. The William Getz Corp., 90 U.S.P.Q. 339 (N.D.
I1. 1951), plaintiff had a patent on a aqueous solution of certain standard chemicals, to
be used in making dental molds. Patentee sold the mixed chemicals, with instructions to
add water and practice the patent. Defendant followed the same practice. The court found
that the defendant was guilty of contributory infringement, and that plaintiff had not
misused his patent. The similarity to Mercoid is striking: water was one of the described
elements of the composition; yet plaintiff was tying a license to use the combination patent
to only the remaining unpatented elements of the patent. The court, in its oral opinion, stated:
"Now, I do not see the wrong in this case which I saw in the Mercoid case .... And
since I do not see the wrong, of necessity it is presented to me to find out some reason
why I do not see it. And I guess the best reason is that the water referred to in this
patent is just an environment. I guess that it is as good a reason as anyone
can suggest. I do not see why it is not valid.
"At any rate ... it would just be reducing a very excellent rule to an absurdity,
to say that this plaintiff is misusing its patent because every time it sells a mixture
of sodium alginate . . . it does not also sell a little water."
Id. at 341.
See also Metallizing Engineering Co. v. Metallizing Co., 62 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y.
1945); Detroit Lubirator Co. v. Toussaint, 57 F. Supp. 837 (N.D. Ill. 1944). For a
case with a very similar factual situation in which the result was different, see Dr. Sals-
bury's Labs. v. I. D. Russell Co., 198 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1952).
For general discussion of the confusion resulting from these conflicting decisions, see
Eastman, Contributory Infringement and the Combination Patent, 48 MIcH. L. REV. 183
(1945-46) ; Mathews, Contributory Infringement and the Mercoid Case, 27 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'v 260 (1945).
16. The doctrine of Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27
(1931), does nothing to change the scope of contributory infringement. Rather, it denies
relief, on the basis of the defense of misuse, when the patentee is attempting to use his patent
to obtain a monopoly over staples of commerce. The Court expressly indicated that the
defense of misuse affected only the question of recovery, and was careful to distinguish
the case at bar from Leeds & Catlin v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 213 U.S. 325 (1909),
the leading case enunciating the doctrine of contributory infringement. See note 6 supra;
19561
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patentee a cause of action against others who sell staple articles of commerce
for use as an element in his combination patent.17 Nevertheless, some courts
have interpreted the misuse doctrine as precluding recovery whenever a staple
or other unpatented article of commerce was involved.' 8 In these cases the
patented combination derived its value from a novel use of an unpatented
article. Relief for contributory infringement would, it was felt, restrict the
use, and possibly the sale, of the article. Thus, not past misuse, but the
possibility that enforcement of the patent would encourage some future violation
of the antitrust laws seems to have been the criterion.
Congress enacted section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952 19 to eliminate the
confusion existing in this area of patent law.20 Paragraph (a) of section 271
simply restates the traditional definition of direct infringement.2 ' Paragraph
(d) limits the definition of misuse by expressly excluding certain types of
conduct from the doctrine. The section is completed by paragraphs (b) and
(c) which give, for the first time, statutory expression to the contributory
infringement doctrine.22 Paragraph (c) states that (1) the sale of (2) a
Western Elec. Co. v. Talking Pictures Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938). See also, Diamond,
supra note 13.
17. Prior to Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931),
the sale of a staple article of commerce, coupled with the requisite intent that it be used in
infringing a patent, was contributory infringement. See Individual Drinking Cup Co. v.
Public Serv. Cup Co., 250 Fed. 620 (2d Cir. 1918) (paper cups); Canda v. Michigan
Malleable Iron Co., 124 Fed. 486 (6th Cir. 1903). See note 16 stepra.
18. See, e.g., Philad Co. v. Lechler Labs., Inc., 107 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1941); J. C.
Ferguson Mfg. Works, Inc. v. American Lecithin Co., 94 F.2d 729 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 304 U.S. 573 (1938) ; Alemite Corp. v. Lubair Corp., 62 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1933).
19. 66 STAT. 811, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1952).
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority
makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the
term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an
infringer.
(c) Whoever knowingly sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture.
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a
patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the samc
to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent,
and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-
infringing use shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or col-
tributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse
or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or morc
of the following: (1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another
without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (2)
licensed or authorized another to perform acts which if performed without his
consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought to
enforce his patent rights against infringement or contributory infringement.
20. See H.R. EP . No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
21. See notes 2 and 19 supra.
22. See note 8 supra.
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material part of a patented invention (3) not a staple article of commerce (4)
known by the seller to be especially adapted for infringing use, is contributory
infringement. Paragraph (b) completes the concept by making one who
"actively induces" infringement liable as an infringer.
Far from eliminating confusion, section 271 has raised new uncertainties.
The language of paragraph (d) hardly intimates that it overrules Mercoid,
but the drafters, and at least some of the commentators, agree that it does.
23
Paragraph (c) introduces circularity by incorporating the term "staple article
of commerce" into the definition of contributory infringement, for the labelling
of an article as a "staple" may depend on whether there has been an infringe-
ment.2 4 This same definition considerably restricts the doctrine of contributory
infringement. A patentee whose combination includes a staple will now be
23. The principal consultant for § 271, Giles Rich, stated that paragraph (d) was
intended to overrule the Mercoid decision. Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 4 of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 17, at 14 (1950). See also
Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 35 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
476 (1953). Some writers concur in this opinion: see Note, GEO. WASH. L. REv. 246
(1952); REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS 251-53 (1955) (hereinafter cited as Ai-'y GEN. REP.).
However, from a study of the wording of paragraph (d), supra note 19, the statute
falls short of the mark. For the statute merely declares that it shall not be misuse for
a patentee to perform acts, or to license others to perform acts, which if committed by
another would be contributory infringement. These acts would be, in a patented com-
bination, the sale of one of the elements with the purpose of inducing direct infringement.
But the essence of the patentee's offense in the Mercoid case was the tying of the license
to use the patented combination to the sale of one of the elements, not merely the sale
of the element. And this tying in factor is not excused in paragraph (d). See Note, 66
HAiv. L. REv. 909 (1953).
In the first case adjudicated under this paragraph of the statute, the court held that
the statute in no way affected the principle laid down in Mercoid. Dr. Salsbury's Labs.
v. I. D. Russell Co., 212 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1954), affirming 121 F. Supp 709 (W.D.
Mo. 1953). See also Arr'y GEN. REP. 253 (dissenting opinion of Eugene V. Rostow);
Hearings Before Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly Problems of the House Coin-
inittee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. III, ser. 3, at 1926-27 (1951) (testimony
of Eugene V. Rostow). A more recent decision recognized "some merit" in the interpreta-
tion that paragraph (d) changed the Mercoid rule. Electric Pipe Line, Inc. v. Fluid Sys-
tems, Inc., 109 U.S.P.Q. 24 (2d Cir. 1956).
24. The courts have been careful not to limit themselves by giving definition to a
staple article of commerce. See, e.g., Philad Co. v. Lechler Labs., Inc., 107 F.2d 747 (2d
Cir. 1939).
According to the most generally accepted definition, a staple of commerce is an article
capable of substantial noninfringing use. See Diamond, supra note 13; Note, 39 ILL L.
Rv. 55 (1944). But see Martin, The Patent Codification Act, 36 J. PAT. OFF. Soc*,'
625, 639 (1954) (suggesting that Gagnier Fibre Products v. Fourslides, 112 F. Supp. 926
(E.D. Mich. 1953) may define a staple as anything which is unpatented).
The circularity of these definitions can best be illustrated by example. An article
may have ten uses, all of them in patented combinations. If the article is not a staple,
any sale to an unlicensed user will be contributory infringement; if it is a staple, no sale
will be contributory infringement. But the question of the article being a staple may well
turn on whether the sales constitute contributory infringement.
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denied relief under (c) against an infringer who, prior to the Act, could have
escaped liability only by showing misuse.
25
More important, however, is the possibility that paragraph (b) creates
a new cause of action. Lacking any specific indication of its coverage, the
sanction in (b) against one who "actively induces" infringement will support
nearly any interpretation. 26 For example, this phrase can even be read to prohibit
conduct which is specifically excluded from the prohibitions of paragraph (c) .27
So broad an interpretation would permit patentees to enjoin conduct essential
to free competition and would, of course, turn paragraph (c)'s studied phrases
into surplusage.2 8 On the other hand, (b) can be interpreted so narrowly as
to limit unduly the value of the patent grant.2 9 This paragraph is now being
judicially interpreted for the first time in the pending case of Deering, Milliken,
& Co. v. Temp-Resisto Corp.30 But because of its strong facts, 31 the case will
25. By incorporating the reference to staple articles of commerce, the 1952 Act made
the definition of contributory infringement more restrictive than it had been. See notes
16 and 17 supra. It may well be, however, that the drafters of the bill felt that since, in
the Carbice case, 283 U.S. 27 (1931), and those cases following, relief was denied a
patentee who had attempted to obtain a monopoly over staples used in his patent, misuse
had produced a substantive change in the definition of contributory infringement.
26. One of the main objections made at committee hearings on the formulation of
§ 271 was that paragraph (b) was entirely ambiguous. Many of the witnesses considered
that it was so broad as greatly to extend the scope of contributory infringement. In
fact, it was suggested that a cause of action under paragraph (b) might not require that
there be a resultant direct infringement, or that the defendant intended there to be a
direct infringement; both of these factors were necessary elements of the common law
cause of action for contributory infringement. See Hearings Before Subconmittee on
Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 21, at 21, 25, 31-32 (1948) ; Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 3
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 9, at 97, 116 (1951).
27. A patentee might gain control over the sale of non-staples or even staples simply
by bringing suit under paragraph (b) ; for under paragraph (d) (3) it is not misuse to
bring an action under § 271, and a broad interpretation of paragraph (b) would make
any sale or other action leading to infringement grounds for legal and equitable relief.
28. An argument for this result might be based on the opinion of the master in
Deering, Milliken & Co. v. Temp-Resisto Corp., Civil No. 83-243, S.D.N.Y. (master's
opinion March 6, 1956). There, conduct which was prohibited by paragraph (c) was held
to violate paragraph (b). From this it might be inferred that paragraph (b) comprehends
all conduct touched by the provisions of paragraph (c). But it would be erroneous to con-
clude that, because paragraph (b) may cover some of paragraph (c)'s inclusions, it also
covers its exclusions. See text at note 40 infra.
29. There were at common law many offenses which, though not involving a sale
falling under paragraph (c), were equally detrimental to the patent grant. A narrow
interpretation of paragraph (b), confining contributory infringement to little more than
the conduct prohibited under paragraph (c), would not allow the patentee recourse to
this type of offense. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. DeForest Radio, 28 F.2d 641 (3d Cir.
1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 656 (1929) (placing order for product which can be made
only by infringing a patented process) ; American Tel. & Tel. v. Radio Audion Co., 281
Fed. 200 (D. Del.), aff'd, 284 Fed. 1020 (3d Cir. 1922) (promise of indemnity against
infringement suit) ; Conmar Products Corp. v. Tibony, 63 F. Supp. 372 (E.D.N.Y. 1945)
(designing and building infringing equipment).
30. Civil No. 83-243, S.D.N.Y. (master's opinion March 6, 1956).
31. Plaintiff owned a patent on a heat reflecting fabric, and a subsidiary combination
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do little to mark the limits of paragraph (b)'s vague prohibition against active
inducement.
Presented with vague statutory language, the courts should promote the
certainty which Congress sought by giving to paragraphs (b) and (c) the
meaning which Congress intended. And the intent of Congress, as evidenced
by the legislative history of the Act, was to codify the judicial doctrine of con-
tributory infringement, as it existed prior to the confusion generated by the
ilMercoid case.
32
From the fact that paragraphs (b) and (c) were intended as a codification
of prior case law, the courts can determine the types of behavior falling within
each paragraph. The language of paragraph (c) states quite specifically the
trespass toward which it is directed.3 3 All other conduct which would have
been an offense under previous law necessarily falls within the ambit of
paragraph (b). 3 4 The most obvious example is an act which, while tending
to encourage infringement, is not a sale. Leasing machinery which is to be
used in illegally practising a patent,3 5 furnishing expert advice on the construc-
tion of infringing machinery, 36 and ordering from one manufacturer goods
which can be produced only by the patented process of a third party,37 all
decrease the incentive value of a patent monopoly as much as the sale pro-
hibited by paragraph (c). All of these examples were offenses which are now
proscribed by paragraph (b). In addition, these and similar offenses may be
coupled with a sale in violation of paragraph (c).38 The patentee might then
patent covering the incorporation of this material into garments. The principal defendant
manufactured a similar fabric, and advertised extensively, inducing garment makers to
use defendant's fabric in garments. Plaintiff brought suit, charging direct infringement
of the main patent, and contributory infringement of the subsidiary patent. A special
master was appointed. In his report, filed March 6, 1956, he found the patents valid, that
defendant had directly infringed the fabric patent, and that defendant was guilty of con-
tributory infringement under paragraph (b), 35 U.S.C. § 271, for actively inducing infringe-
ment. As the master's report has not yet been passed on by the court, it of course
reflects only the opinion of the master, not that of the court. However, a master's
findings of fact, unless clearly erroneous, must prevail. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e) (2).
32. See note 20 supra and accompanying text. See also Hearings Before Subcom-
inittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 9, at
155-63, 169-75 (1951); 98 CONG. REc 9323 (1952) (statement by committee chairman
that the Patent Act "codifies the present patent law"). But see note 25 supra.
33. See note 19 supra.
34. One exception may be necessary, however. At common law the sale of a staple,
coupled with the necessary intent, was actionable contributory infringement. See notes
16 and 17 supra. By reasoning from the premise that paragraphs (b) and (c) together
codify the common law, and the fact that the sale of a staple is excluded from paragraph
(c), the sale must violate paragraph (b). But since Congress explicitly expressed the
exception, it should not be destroyed by the general expression of an intent to codify
the case law. See also note 25 supra.
35. E.g., Graham v. Earl, 92 Fed. 155 (9th Cir. 1897).
36. E.g., Toppan v. Tiffany Refrigerator Car Co., 39 Fed. 420 (N.D. Ill. 1889);
Conmar Products Corp. v. Tibony, 63 F. Supp. 372 (E.D.N.Y. 1945).
37. E.g., American Tel. & Tel. v. Radio Audion Co., 281 Fed. 200 (D. Del.), aff'd,
284 Fed. 1020 (2d Cir. 1922).
38. See, e.g., Cugley v. Bundy Incubator Co., 93 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1937) (selling
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seek redress for both acts together under paragraph (b) or for the sale alone
under paragraph (c) ; the choice of the applicable paragraph should depend
only upon the evidence available.39 And acts which were offenses under prior
case law might also be coupled with conduct specifically exempted from para-
graph (c), as, for example, the sale of staple articles of commerce. While sale
of a staple would not by itself violate paragraph (b) ,40 the total transaction
would.41
Since paragraphs (b) and (c) affirm previous law, the necessary elements
of the statutory and "common law" actions are identical. Thus, the patentee
suing under paragraph (b) must prove that defendant's conduct actually cul-
minated in a direct infringement by a third party,42 and that defendant in-
tended this result.43 Even with this guide, however, it will often be difficult,
particularly with reference to paragraph (b), to determine whether defendant's
conduct violates the statute.
The courts should carefully consider the policies underlying patent law
in general, and contributory infringement in particular, in determining the
egg incubator with instructions how to use to infringe patented process); Metallizing
Engineering Co. v. Metallizing Co., 62 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (selling trans-
former, advertising and illustrating its utility in patented metal coating process). See also
Risdon Iron & Locomotive Works v. Trent, 92 Fed. 375 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1899), modified
on other grounds, 102 Fed. 643 (3d Cir. 1900).
39. See Deering, Milliken & Co. v. Temp-Resisto Corp., Civil No. 83-243, S.D.N.Y.
(master's opinion March 6, 1956).
40. See also the original versions of § 271: H.R. 5988, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948);
H.R. 3866, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). These stated in an independent section that the
sale of a staple article of commerce would not of itself constitute contributory infringe-
ment. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trade-Marks, and Copyrights of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 21, at 15 (1948) ; the
final version was intended to convey the same meaning. See also notes 27 and 28 supra.
41. See Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee on the Ju-
diciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 17, at 18 (1949). See, e.g., American Stainless Steel
Co. v. Ludlum Steel Co., 16 F.2d 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1926) (sale of stainless steel and adver-
tising how to fashion steel into infringing cutlery) ; Imperial Chemical Mfg. Co. v. Stein,
69 Fed. 616 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1895), modified, 77 Fed. 612 (2d Cir. 1896) (sale of staple
chemicals used in patented hair dye, with instructions how to combine and infringe).
42. See, e.g., Lincoln Engineering Co. v. Stewart-Warner Co., 91 F.2d 757 (7th Cir.
1937), rev'd on other grounds, 303 U.S. 545 (1938) ; Bullock Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. West-
inghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 129 Fed. 105 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 194 U.S. 636 (1904) (no
direct infringement since parts of patented combination used outside United States).
See also Popular Mechanics Co. v. Brown, 245 Fed. 859 (7th Cir. 1917) (contributory
infringement if acts lead to or threaten direct infringement).
43. Intent is a necessary element of contributory infringement. See Chas. H. Lilly
Co. v. I. F. Laucks, Inc., 68 F2d 175 (9th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 573 (1934) ;
Rumford Chemical Works v. Hygienic Chemical Co., 148 Fed. 862 (C.C.D.N.J. 1906),
aff'd 154 Fed. 65 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 207 U.S. 592 (1907). But, if the patentee proves
that defendant sold an element having no use but in his patented combination, intent is
imputed to defendant. See New York Scaffolding Co. v. Whitney, 224 Fed. 452 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 239 U.S. 640 (1915); Canda v. Michigan Malleable Iron Co., 124 Fed.




scope of paragraph (b). Congress can and should express its intent more
clearly by clarifying paragraph (d) and by amplifying paragraph (b). But
until it does, cases will arise which are neither clear under the language of
the statute nor compelled by case law precedents.44 The courts must then
follow their established policy of confining the protection of the law exclusively
to the invention or discovery covered by the patent grant.45 But it must be
remembered that the patent monopoly is the primary means of encouraging
invention ;40 the wisdom of continuing the patent system, indeed any incentive
system, as a means of advancing technology and the sciences has been much
debated, but no one has yet succeeded in marshalling facts and arguments
sufficient to end controversy. 47 Rather, Congress has legislated an answer; in
section 271, it has expressed its desire to preserve the combination patent
owner's legal monopoly over the products and processes disclosed in his
patent grant. With a specific exception for staple articles of commerce, Con-
gress has retained the doctrine of contributory infringement as it existed prior
to Mercoid, despite the Supreme Court's implied disapproval of the doctrine.
The courts, consequently, should hew to this congressional policy when inter-
preting paragraph (b) of section 271.
44. "Like all statements of principle, the difficulty lies in its application. This is
peculiarly true in respect of patent infringement .... ." Individual Drinking Cup Co. v. Er-
rett, 297 Fed. 733 (2d Cir. 1924).
For examples of decisions in which the outcome was not specifically illuminated by
like facts in prior cases, see Reliance Constr. Co. v. Hassam Paving Co., 248 Fed. 701
(9th Cir. 1918) (surety of infringer liable as contributory infringer) ; General Elec. Co.
v. DeForest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 656 (1929) (order-
ing goods knowing producer used patented process in their manufacture) ; cf. The Amalga-
mated Dental Co. v. The William Getz Corp., 90 U.S.P.Q. 339 (N.D. Ill. 1951) (question
of whether or not misuse present not illlustrated by prior cases).
45. The courts in recent years have adopted a more restrictive attitude towards
all monopolies. See, generally, Arr'y GEN. REP. This attitude is apparent particularly in
the patent field. The recent expansion of the application of misuse, a doctrine inspired by
the antitrust laws, is but one example. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). Another is the raised standard of invention, the so called
"flash of genius" test announced by the Supreme Court in Cuno Engineering Corp. v.
Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941). The Patent Act of 1952 has also dealt with
this phase of the patent law and attempted to return the standard of invention to the level
existing prior to Cuno. See generally, Lutz, Are the Courts Carrying Out Constitutional
Public Policy on Patents?, 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 766 (1952) ; Martin, The Patent Codifi-
cation Act, 36 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 625 (1954).
46. The Constitution gave Congress the power to "promote the sciences and the useful
arts." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Our patent system, first established in 1790 and most
recently revised in 1952, embodies Congress' principle attempt at fulfilling this constitu-
tional mandate. In the tax laws Congress has provided additional incentive to patentees.
See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1302, 1304.
47. For a highly critical report on our patent system, see HAMILTON, PATENTS AND
FREE ENTERPRISE (TNEC Monograph No. 31, 1941).
For a report which finds much of value in our present patent system, see Report of
the National Patent Planning Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 239, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1943).
The dispute still continues; see, e.g., Celler, Patents and Monopoly, 38 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 425 (1956).
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